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LOCKETT SYMPOSIUM 
LOCKETT V. OHIO AND THE RISE OF MITIGATION
SPECIALISTS 
Russell Stetler* 
This article will discuss the impact of Lockett1 in terms of the rise of 
mitigation specialists—the capital defense team members from a variety 
of multidisciplinary backgrounds whose dedicated function is to 
investigate the social history of the client in order to facilitate an outcome 
that avoids execution. This development could probably not be foreseen 
when the case was argued, but the result was almost immediate. The 
decision clarified the breadth of empathy-evoking mitigating evidence 
that capital defenders could offer in sentencing proceedings.2 But it also 
brought to many lawyers the humbling recognition that they were ill-
equipped to discover this powerful evidence. They needed help. This 
admission rested on two insights: the relevant skill sets for life-history 
investigation were rarely taught in law school, and the sheer amount of 
work required for effective capital defense representation demanded a 
team of professionals with complementary skills. 
In Part I, the article discusses how Lockett ended the confusion that 
resulted from the Supreme Court’s prior death penalty decisions in the 
1970s. In 1972, the Court found in Furman v. Georgia that all the death 
penalty statutes, as applied, were unconstitutional.3 Four years later, a still 
* Russell Stetler is the National Mitigation Coordinator for the federal death penalty projects. He is
based in the Office of the Federal Public Defender in Oakland, California. The views expressed in 
this article are his own. 
1. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the 
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers 
as a basis for a sentence less than death.”). (emphasis in original). 
2. As then Justice Rehnquist observed, “We are now told, in effect, that in order to impose a 
death sentence the judge or jury must receive in evidence whatever the defense attorney wishes them 
to hear.” Id. at 629 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (finding death penalty statutes, as
applied, violated the Eighth Amendment). A single paragraph provided the Court’s per curiam 
opinion. The five concurring justices each wrote separately explaining their individual rationales. 
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divided Court parsed the new post-Furman statutes, finding some 
constitutional while others continued to have constitutional infirmities.4 
A brilliant team of litigators from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, led 
by Anthony G. Amsterdam,5 could not persuade the Supreme Court of the 
United States that capital punishment was per se unconstitutional.6 
However, their success in Woodson v. North Carolina7 and Lockett 
established the critical tension that would haunt capital punishment 
litigation throughout succeeding decades. As Professors Carol and Jordan 
Steiker have observed: 
[T]he Court seemed to be protecting as a matter of constitutional law the 
very discretion Furman had identified as constitutionally problematic. 
But according to the Court, the discretion to withhold the death penalty 
based on mitigating factors is categorically different from the discretion 
to impose the death penalty based on amorphous perceptions of the 
aggravating aspects of the offense. So was born the central tension in 
American death penalty law: its simultaneous command that states cabin 
discretion of who shall die while facilitating discretion of who shall 
live.8 
4. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286–87, 305 (1976) (finding mandatory death
penalty unconstitutional); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 328–30, 336 n.3 (1976) (same); Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (finding newly enacted guided discretion statute
constitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (same); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 
276 (1976) (same). 
5. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 440–60 (1994) (memoir by former Director-
Counsel of NAACP Legal Defense Fund; ch. 32 describes death penalty litigation). Amsterdam had 
argued Furman in 1972, and he continued to direct the post-Furman litigation. 
6. See EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court litigation 1972–1976). 
7. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (“A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the 
character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes 
from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or 
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.”); Id. (citations omitted). 
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally 
reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that 
in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual 
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable 
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.  
8. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 165 (2016) (footnote omitted). Justice White dissented in Lockett with a 
similar warning:  
[I] greatly fear that the effect of the Court’s decision today will be to compel 
constitutionally a restoration of the state of affairs at the time Furman was decided, where 
the death penalty is imposed so erratically and the threat of execution is so attenuated for 
even the most atrocious murders that “its imposition would then be the pointless and 
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In Part II, the article examines the emergence of mitigation 
investigation as a central obligation of capital defense in response to 
Lockett, and the diverse career paths that led nonlawyers (and a few 
lawyers) to the role of mitigation specialists. In the days before email, the 
collective wisdom of the capital defense community was shared through 
articles, manuals, and conferences, but the importance of mitigation 
specialists received early national recognition in the 1980s. 
In Part III, the article concludes by examining the further recognition 
that mitigation specialists have received in the 21st century, from court 
decisions to the revision of the American Bar Association Guidelines for 
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases (in 2003)9 and the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation 
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases (in 2008).10 This 
development coincides with a wider appreciation of the need for 
individualized sentences in all cases, as we begin to return to the 
“enlightened policy” that the High Court respected at the time of 
Woodson11 but temporarily abandoned in the era of mass incarceration. 
The Court has facilitated restoration of the enlightened policy with its 
decisions ending rigid federal sentencing guidelines12 and mandatory life 
without parole sentences for crimes committed by children.13 Mitigation 
specialists, meanwhile, are here to stay. 
I. ENDING THE CONFUSION 
Furman had caused enough confusion. Five justices agreed that the 
existing statutes as applied violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, but they all had different reasons and they did not join one 
needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or 
public purposes.” 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 623 (1978) (citation to his own Furman concurrence omitted). (White, 
J., dissenting). 
9. American Bar Association, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003). 
10. Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty 
Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008). 
11. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
12. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005) (finding federal sentencing
guidelines advisory rather than mandatory). 
13. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (barring life without parole for non-
homicide offenses committed prior to age eighteen); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) 
(barring mandatory life without parole sentences for homicide offenses committed prior to age 
eighteen); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding that Miller applies 
retroactively).  
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another’s individual opinions.14 The legislative backlash was immediate. 
Most of the states whose statutes had been found unconstitutional passed 
new laws attempting to avoid what the Court’s Furman majority had 
found unacceptable.15 When five cases from the new statutes reached the 
Court in 1976, two justices were already of the view that the death penalty 
itself was unconstitutional. Justices Brennan and Marshall never wavered. 
Justice Douglas, who emphasized arbitrariness in his Furman opinion,16 
was gone, and President Gerald Ford had appointed John Paul Stevens to 
replace him.17 President Kennedy’s appointment, Justice White, had no 
problem with any of the new statutes.18 Three justices – Powell, Stevens, 
and Stewart – controlled the outcomes of the 1976 cases.19 The opinions 
finding the mandatory statutes unconstitutional in North Carolina20 and 
Louisiana21 were written by Justices Stewart and Stevens, respectively. 
The opinions upholding the “guided discretion” statutes in Georgia,22 
Florida,23 and Texas24 were written by Justices Stewart, Powell, and 
14. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), for the five separate concurrences; MANDERY, supra 
note 6, for a reconstruction of the internal negotiations that produced the 5-4 outcome. 
15. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976) (thirty-five states enacted new capital 
punishment statutes); MANDERY, supra note 6, at 303–04 (discussing details of the legislative 
response). 
16. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[I]t is a
denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually severe 
punishment.”).  
17. See MANDERY, supra note 6, at 333–34. 
18. Id. at 401–02 (in White’s view all the new statutes satisfied Furman’s mandate). In fact, in 
his dissent in Lockett, Justice White would also note the legislative trend away from individualized 
sentencing as mandatory minimums and federal sentencing guidelines loomed on the horizon: 
The plurality’s general endorsement of individualized sentencing as representing 
enlightened public policy even apart from the Eighth Amendment context . . . is not only 
questionable but also highly inappropriate in light of the fact that Congress, after detailed 
study of the matter, is currently giving serious consideration to legislation adopting the 
view that the goals of the criminal law are best achieved by a system of sentencing which 
narrowly limits the discretion of the sentencer.  
See S. Journal, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1437 (1978) (approved by the Senate on Jan. 30, 1978).” Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 622 n.5 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
19. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601.
Four Justices took the position that all five statutes complied with the Constitution; two 
Justices took the position that none of them complied. Hence, the disposition of each case 
varied according to the votes of three Justices who delivered a joint opinion in each of the 
five cases upholding the constitutionality of the statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, 
and holding those of North Carolina and Louisiana unconstitutional. 
20. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
21. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
24. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). After his retirement from the High Court, Justice
Stevens expressed his regret at joining the majority upholding the Texas statute in 1976. See Sara 
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Stevens, respectively. In all five cases, the three joined one another’s 
opinions. 
Since the 1960s, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund had spearheaded 
the litigation on behalf of the death-sentenced prisoners.25 The lawyers on 
the briefs in the post-Furman cases included Anthony G. Amsterdam26 
and Peggy Davis27 (both later law faculty at NYU), Jack Greenberg (later 
a professor at Columbia law school),28 Adam Stein (a co-founder of the 
first integrated civil rights law firm in the Southeast),29 and the late James 
Nabrit III (another veteran civil rights lawyer).30 Amsterdam argued 
Woodson, Jurek, and Roberts on March 30-31, 1976.31 In all three epic 
courtroom dramas, he was opposed by the Solicitor General of the United 
States, Robert Bork, arguing as an amicus.32 
If the Court could not be persuaded to find the death penalty in itself 
unconstitutional, LDF’s victory in Woodson and Roberts (barring 
Olkon, Event with Justice Stevens Recounts Remarkable Supreme Court Career, UCHICAGO NEWS 
(Oct. 4, 2011), https://news.uchicago.edu/story/event-justice-stevens-recounts-remarkable-supreme-
court-career [https://perma.cc/B4FV-XEZX]. 
25. See GREENBERG, supra note 5. 
26. See NYU EMERITUS LAW FACULTY PROFILE, Anthony G. Amsterdam,
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=19743 
[https://perma.cc/98AP-6MD3] (last visited July 4, 2018). Even before Furman, Amsterdam had been 
recognized as a brilliant young lawyer taking on work of national importance. After clerking for 
Justice Frankfurter, he joined the law faculty at the University of Pennsylvania and was named the 
Young Man of the Year by the Philadelphia Junior Chamber of Commerce in 1966 after he co-wrote 
an ACLU amicus brief in Miranda v. Arizona from which Chief Justice Warren lifted many passages 
“wholesale.” See Nadya Labi, A Man Against the Machine, NYU LAW MAGAZINE (Autumn 2007), 
at 19, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_DLV_008765.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z83A-
6NGG]. Even his undergraduate peers had recognized Amsterdam’s extraordinary gifts, describing 
him in the yearbook not only as “far and above the best student in the class,” but also “the one Senior 
in the class who can make an important contribution to the world.” The 1957 Record, HAVERFORD 
COLLEGE (1957) at 103, https://ia800208.us.archive.org/1/items/recordofclass1957have/
recordofclass1957have_bw.pdf [https://perma.cc/842X-AQQD] (last visited July 4, 2018). 
27. See NYU LAW FACULTY PROFILE, Peggy Cooper Davis, 
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=19866 
[https://perma.cc/2JQ2-5ULR] (last visited July 4, 2018). 
28. See GREENBERG, supra note 5. Author’s biography on book jacket describes Greenberg’s
thirty-five years with the Legal Defense Fund (1949-1984) prior to joining the faculty at Columbia 
Law School. 
29. See Marisa Bakker, The Fight Goes on for Adam Stein, THE DAILY TAR HEEL (Nov. 24,
2015, 12:09 AM) http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/11/the-fight-goes-on-for-adam-stein 
[https://perma.cc/GQ4C-DZS9]. 
30. See William Yardley, James M. Nabrit, a Fighter for Civil Rights, Dies at 80, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/us/james-m-nabrit-a-fighter-
for-civil-rights-dies-at-80.html [https://perma.cc/2BWN-VXMH]. 
31. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); 
32. Id. 
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mandatory death sentences and mandating individualized sentencing as 
constitutionally required) foreshadowed what was to come in Lockett and 
locked the Court into the principle that no crime, however heinous, 
required imposition of the death penalty, and every person accused of a 
capital crime was entitled to an opportunity to persuade the sentencer that 
he was not the worst of the worst. Nonetheless, confusion reigned. 
In California, for example, newly enacted Penal Code § 190.3 
contained an apparent conflict, in that ¶ 1 provided for any evidence 
relevant to mitigation, while ¶ 5 enumerated only ten specific factors 
which the trier “shall take into account.” In the syllabus for one of the first 
capital case defense seminars in the state, one veteran public defender 
expressed his confusion and frustration: 
Most of the doubt and uncertainty lies within the penalty phase. 
Although strong arguments can be made for allowing the defendant to 
produce evidence going to such matters as common mercy, defendant’s 
total value within the community, his character, history, and 
background, the more strict and severe interpretation is one that admits 
the production of evidence of only specifically enumerated factors. 
Large wars can be expected to be waged in that never-never land falling 
between paragraph one with its broad expansive admissions of proofs 
and paragraph five with its rather stringent limitations.33 
In Lockett, the High Court agreed to review the constitutionality of 
“a[n Ohio] statute that narrowly limits the sentencer’s discretion to 
consider the circumstances of the crime and the record and character of 
the offender as mitigating factors.”34 In delivering the Court’s opinion, 
Chief Justice Burger (a dissenter in Furman) blamed the variety of 
opinions in Furman for the “confusion as to what was required in order to 
33. James Jenner, The California Death Penalty: Trial Tactical Considerations, in
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COOPERATION WITH CALIFORNIA PUBLIC 
DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, STRATEGY SEMINAR ON DEATH PENALTY TRIALS, Hastings College of 
the Law, San Francisco, Mar. 24-25, 1978. 
34. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 589 (1978).
Once a verdict of aggravated murder with specifications had been returned, the Ohio death 
penalty statute required the trial judge to impose a death sentence unless, after 
“considering the nature and circumstances of the offense” and Lockett’s “history, 
character, and condition,” he found by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . the victim 
had induced or facilitated the offense, . . . [the defendant] “was under duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation,” or . . . the offense was “primarily the product of . . . psychosis or 
mental deficiency.”  
Id. at 593–94 (code citation omitted). The pertinent provisions of the statute were appended to the 
opinion at 609–13. 
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impose the death penalty in accord with the Eighth Amendment.”35 The 
limits on the sentencer’s discretion in Ohio seemed to the Chief Justice to 
be “a direct response to Furman.”36 He wryly noted how the various 
opinions both in Furman and the five cases in 1976 had created further 
confusion as states continued to revise their statutes: “The signals from 
this Court have not, however, always been easy to decipher. The States 
now deserve the clearest guidance that the Court can provide; we have an 
obligation to reconcile previously differing views in order to provide that 
guidance.”37 
In a concurrence, Justice Marshall summarized most of the 
mitigating circumstances that the judge in Sandra Lockett’s case was not 
permitted to consider: her degree of involvement in the crime (getaway 
driver who did not actually commit or intend to commit the homicide), 
her age (twenty-one), or her prospects for rehabilitation.38 As Chief 
Justice Burger noted, the trial court “judge said that he had ‘no alternative, 
whether [he] like[d] the law or not’ but to impose the death penalty” on 
Lockett.39 
The Chief Justice traced the long history of individualized sentencing 
in this country, and the concomitant principle “that the sentencing judge’s 
‘possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s 
life and characteristics’ is ‘[highly] relevant–if not essential–[to the] 
selection of an appropriate sentence.’”40 He quoted with approval his own 
dissent in Furman: “Most would agree that ‘the 19th century movement 
away from mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened 
introduction of flexibility into the sentencing process.’”41 Woodson’s 
holding that individualized sentencing is constitutionally indispensable in 
the capital context virtually dictated the outcome in Lockett: the Court was 
not writing on a “clean slate.”42 
The Court’s conclusion dictated that mitigation evidence would be 
at the core of capital defense representation in the decades that followed: 
35. Id. at 599, n.6 (noting the predictability of this outcome as he had foreseen in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 403 (1972)). 
36. Lockett, 438 U.S. at n.7. 
37. Id. at 602. 
38. Id. at 619–21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote, “The Ohio statute, with its 
blunderbuss, virtually mandatory approach to imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes, 
wholly fails to recognize the unique individuality of every criminal defendant who comes before its 
courts.” Id. at 620–21. Justice Marshall failed to mention “that Lockett had committed no major 
offenses” as a juvenile or as an adult prior to the capital case. Id. at 594.  
39. Id. at 594 (alterations in original). 
40. Id. at 603 (citation omitted; emphasis and alterations added by the Chief Justice). 
41. Id., citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 597 (1978). 
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[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that 
the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.43 
After noting the “flexible techniques” and postconviction remedies that 
may be available to modify a wrongful sentence in a noncapital case, the 
Court added a comment about finality and reliability: “The nonavailability 
of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital 
sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a 
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.”44 
II. THE RISE OF MITIGATION SPECIALISTS
Some visionary capital defenders of course had not waited for 
Lockett’s clarification. Georgia lawyer Millard Farmer had assembled a 
group he called the Team Defense Project to meet the challenge of the 
new capital punishment statutes. As early as 1976, he and his colleague 
James Kinard were invited to the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association Convention in Philadelphia to discuss their effective penalty 
phase presentation in a post-Furman case in Harris County, Texas.45 
Defendant Bernardino Sierra “had committed twelve robberies, two 
maimings, and three killings” in an eight-hour spree.46 Experts were 
quoted as saying this was the “most likely case for capital punishment in 
the history of Harris County.”47 Mr. Sierra’s mother then testified about 
his childhood: 
When he was a little boy, his stepfather would come home drunk at night 
and beat him with a wire whip, catching him while he was asleep. His 
stepfather would lock him out of the house at night sometimes, and he 
would crawl under it to make his miserable bed and try to sleep. Often 
he was hungry and had no food. He ate out of garbage cans. He brought 
43. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 605 (citation omitted). 
45. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (1983) (describing unreported capital trial of Bernardino Sierra 
based on statements by Farmer and Kinard), citing Farmer & Kinard, The Trial of the Penalty Phase 
(remarks at the National Legal Aid and Defender Association Convention, Philadelphia, 1976), 
reprinted in California Office of the Public Defender, 2 California Death Penalty Defense Manual N-
33. 
46. Id. at 300. 
47. Id. 
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the best food he found there home for his mother and little sister.48 
Mr. Sierra’s son also testified. The jury spared Sierra’s life.49 Millard 
Farmer’s “Team Defense” would soon become legendary in capital 
defense representation.50 
But Lockett put capital defense lawyers throughout the country on 
notice that they could offer expansive mitigation about the character and 
record of their clients, and the circumstances of their crimes. While it may 
have taken some time for Millard Farmer’s reputation to spread at national 
training programs and in later law review articles, opinions from the 
Supreme Court of the United States reached practitioners more quickly, 
even in the pre-Internet era. Lawyers in multiple jurisdictions began 
looking in a variety of directions for professionals who could help uncover 
the life-saving narratives. 
One California lawyer looked to the journalism school at Berkeley, 
where the late Lacey Fosburgh was teaching. A former New York 
Times reporter, Fosburgh, had written a best-selling book about a murder 
case she had covered for the newspaper.51 The lawyer wanted her to 
investigate the life and mind of his client, just as she had meticulously 
studied the killer who had been the subject of her articles and book. After 
her successful work in developing the capital client’s mitigation evidence, 
Fosburgh wrote about the critical role she had played: 
[A] significant legal blind spot existed between the roles played by the 
private investigator and the psychiatrist, the two standard information-
getters in the trial process. Neither one was suited to the task at hand 
here—namely discovering and then communicating the complex human 
reality of the defendant’s personality in a sympathetic way. 
. . . 
Significantly, the defendant’s personal history and family life, his 
obsessions, aspirations, hopes, and flaws, are rarely a matter of physical 
evidence. Instead they are both discovered and portrayed through 
48. Id. at 300-01. 
49. Id. at 301. 
50. See, e.g., Team Defense Project, Team Defense in Capital Cases, FORUM, May–June 
1978, at 24, 24; Michael G. Millman, Interview:Millard Farmer, FORUM, Nov.–Dec. 1984, at 31, 
31-33. See also Jill E. Miller, The Defense Team in Capital Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1117, 1123, 
n.51 (2003) (“Millard Farmer, an attorney who assisted with the Team Defense Project in Georgia in 
1976, was one of the first to articulate the team concept in capital defense work. The project employed 
an interdisciplinary approach and strategies that reached beyond the courtroom in representing its 
clients.”) 
51. LACEY FOSBURGH, CLOSING TIME: THE TRUE STORY OF THE “GOODBAR” MURDER 
(1977). 
60 CONLAWNOW [10:51 
narrative, incident, scene, memory, language, style, and even a whole 
array of intangibles like eye contact, body movement, patterns of 
speech—things that to a jury convey as much information, if not more, 
as any set of facts. But all of this is hard to recognize or develop, 
understand or systematize without someone on the defense team having 
it as his specific function. This person should have nothing else to do 
but work with the defendant, his family, friends, enemies, business 
associates and casual acquaintances, perhaps even duplicating some of 
what the private detective does, but going beyond that and looking for 
more. This takes a lot of time and patience.52 
Lawyers in Los Angeles turned to a former probation officer, Casey 
Cohen, to help them prepare the mitigation case. Cohen became a regular 
faculty member at California’s Capital Case Defense Seminar in the 
1980s, and he was interviewed for a cover story in the defense bar 
magazine.53 A key figure in the conceptual development of mitigation 
evidence was Professor Craig Haney, who had a law degree as well as a 
Ph.D. in social psychology from Stanford. He also became a regular 
faculty member at the California death penalty seminar, and he testified 
in many capital sentencing proceedings as the social historian who could 
interpret the significant influences in the client’s development.54 
A social worker in New Jersey was also featured on the cover of the 
California defense bar magazine.55 Cessie Alfonso had been “working at 
the second largest psychiatric emergency room in the country, Kings 
County Hospital in Brooklyn.”56 After working on a few capital cases 
together, Alfonso and her colleague, Katharine Baur, both left the hospital 
to work fulltime on mitigation.57 In the decade following Lockett, by 1988, 
Alfonso and Baur had worked on over sixty-five cases.58 
52. Lacey Fosburgh, The Nelson Case: A Model for a New Approach to Capital Trials, in
CALIFORNIA STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY MANUAL, 1982 supplement, 
N6-N10, N7 (July 1982) (emphasis added). This article also appeared in the magazine of the 
California defense bar, Lacey Fosburgh, The Nelson Case: A Model for a New Approach to Capital 
Trials, FORUM Sept.–Oct. 1982, at 31, 32.  
53. The author attended the California Capital Case Defense Seminar annually throughout this 
period. See also Anne E. Fragasso, Interview: Casey Cohen, FORUM, Jan.–Feb. 1987, 22, 26. 
54. Professor Haney’s publications in the area of mitigation came a bit later. See, e.g., Craig 
Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 547 (1995); CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM (2005); Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the 
Nature and Logic of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835 (2008);  
55. Leslie H. Abramson, Interview: Cessie Alfonso, FORUM, Mar.–Apr. 1988, at 24–27. 
56. Id. at 25. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 26. Alfonso and Baur also wrote about their work in the monthly publication of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Enhancing Capital Defense: The Role of the 
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In states like Florida and Virginia where executions came quickly in 
the post-Furman era and there was no funding for lawyers to represent 
death-sentenced prisoners under warrant, two extraordinary anti-death 
penalty activists who were recruiting volunteer lawyers in the direst 
circumstances also began uncovering mitigating evidence for clemency 
presentations and post-conviction litigation. The late Marie Deans had 
come to Virginia to head the Virginia Coalition on Jails and Prisons 
(whose focus had been prison conditions), but her empathy for the death-
sentenced prisoners whom she encountered led her to become a pioneer 
in mitigation investigation.59 In Florida, the late Scharlette Holdman ran 
the Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice and turned her training in 
anthropology into a methodology for mitigation investigation.60 Today, 
Holdman’s multigenerational methodology is widely recognized as 
“creating a model for the life-history investigations that the American Bar 
Association now considers standard in death penalty defense work.”61 
One lawyer who played a key role in establishing the breadth of 
mitigation evidence and the techniques for discovering it was also a 
minister. Jeff Blum was the Executive Director of the Tennessee 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; he and his wife shared in the 
ministry of a United Methodist congregation.62 In 1992, the Capital Case 
Resource Center of Tennessee published Blum’s lengthy Mitigation 
Workbook providing extensive guidance in multiple areas of mitigation 
investigation, including neurological impairment, psychological 
impairment, dysfunctional family, substance abuse, social/cultural 
Forensic Clinical Social Worker, THE CHAMPION, June 1986, at 26 (describing their work on death 
penalty cases in New Jersey, Connecticut, and Ohio, as well as a military capital case in Rhode Island). 
They astutely pointed out that mitigation evidence was not only valued for possible presentation in 
sentencing proceedings, but also to facilitate plea bargains. Id. at 28. 
59. See TODD C. PEPPERS & MARGARET A. ANDERSON, A COURAGEOUS FOOL: MARIE DEANS 
AND HER STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (2017). 
60. See Peter Carlson, Florida’s Death Row Defender Stands Between 89 Condemned Men
and the Electric Chair, PEOPLE (July 11, 1983, 12:00 PM) https://people.com/archive/floridas-death-
row-defender-stands-between-89-condemned-men-and-the-electric-chair-vol-20-no-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/7B7X-YUWF]; Maurice Chammah, We Saw Monsters. She Saw Humans. 
Scharlette Holdman, pioneering foe of the death penalty, dies at 70, MARSHALL PROJECT, (July 13, 
2017, 5:58 PM) https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/13/we-saw-monsters-she-saw-humans 
[https://perma.cc/73AA-U9GF] (last visited July 6, 2018). 
61. Emily Langer, Scharlette Holdman, activist known as “Angel of Death Row,” dies at 70, 
THE WASHINGTON POST, (July 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
obituaries/scharlette-holdman-activist-known-as-angel-of-death-row-dies-at-
70/2017/07/24/6638b100-7079-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html?utm_term=.2ef641e502ee 
[https://perma.cc/K5ZH-BTKM] quoting Robert Dunham, executive director of the Death Penalty 
Information Center, concerning Holdman’s role in developing this methodology. 
62. Jeff Blum, The Ten Commandment of Religious Testimony, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1987, at 
23. 
62 CONLAWNOW [10:51 
factors, “positive prisoner” evidence, offense-based factors, “good 
person” evidence, and victim-related factors.63 
In 1985, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (which 
had hosted and publicized the work of Millard Farmer and Stuart Kinard 
back in 1976)64 first published Standards for the Appointment of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.65 Standard 11.4.1(d)(3), Investigation, 
noted the potential use of mitigation specialists.66 And from the land of 
Lockett, three Ohio social workers wrote in 1987: “The mitigation 
specialist is a professional who, as attorneys across the nation are 
recognizing, should be included and will be primary to the defense 
team.”67 In 1989, the American Bar Association published its first 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases,68 incorporating the same reference to the potential use of 
mitigation specialists that had appeared four years earlier in the NLADA 
Standards.69 A decade later, the Atlantic magazine’s Word Watch column, 
compiled by the editor of the American Heritage Dictionary, discovered 
“mitigation specialist” as a newly coined term!70 
III. MITIGATION SPECIALISTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
As we entered the 21st century, the importance of mitigation 
specialists was well recognized. When the American Bar Association 
published its revised Death Penalty Guidelines in 2003, there was 
extensive discussion of mitigation specialists, both in the black letter text 
and in the Commentary.71 That same year, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the nonlawyer who had gathered the post-conviction 
63. JEFF BLUM, MITIGATION WORKBOOK (1992). 
64. See Goodpaster, supra at note 45. 
65. National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Standards for the Appointment of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, http://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/death-penalty/black-letter 
[https://perma.cc/S7H6-52ZD] (last visited July 6, 2018). 
66. Id.
67. James Hudson et al., Using the Mitigation Specialist and the Team Approach, THE 
CHAMPION, June 1987, at 33, 36. Hudson and one of his co-authors had worked in the Mitigation 
Specialists Department of the Ohio State Public Defender’s Office. Id. at 33. 
68. American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, www.ambar.org/1989guidelines [https://perma.cc/K8L2-ZZVS](last visited 
July 6, 2018). 
69. National Legal Aid & Defender Association, supra at note 65. 
70. Word Watch, THE ATLANTIC, (Apr. 1999), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/1999/04/word-watch/377573/ [https://perma.cc/WDK9-VSLT] . 
71. Reprinted in American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance 
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003). See id. at 952 et seq., 999 et 
seq. 
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mitigation evidence that proved prejudice in the landmark case on 
ineffective assistance, Wiggins v. Smith.72 Five years later, the 
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams 
in Death Penalty Cases appeared.73 In summarizing the development of 
these mitigation guidelines, Professor Sean D. O’Brien also discussed the 
multiple pathways that had led “skilled journalists, anthropologists, 
educators, social workers, and others” to the mitigation profession.74 
If the rise of this profession could not have been foreseen when 
Lockett was litigated, neither could we have appreciated the role that 
mitigation, and mitigation specialists, would ultimately play in noncapital 
cases. Multiple public defender offices now embrace holistic approaches 
to defense representation. Sentencing advocacy has become a critical part 
of the defense function in federal court since once-rigid, mandatory 
guidelines have become advisory.75 The end of mandatory life without 
parole sentences for juveniles has created a two-fold need to show courts 
the mitigation that might have been presented when the child was 
originally tried, and who the individual has become in the intervening 
years as she seeks reentry into society.76 
Forty years after Lockett, one thing is certain: mitigation specialists 
are here to stay.77 
72. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003). The Court did not use the term “mitigation 
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